Intro
This talk is premised on the following two assumptions:
That the momentum of China’s becoming the next predominant power is
unstoppable; the question is when it will happen; and
That the United States (and many others) will continue to be apprehensive
of the so-called "China threat."
I will address the intriguing question of whether the rising China is going
to be a threat. As a professor should do, instead of making wild predictions,
I will try to show a way (or, a methodology) whereby a reasonably adequate
answer can be derived. In doing so, we will draw upon the following three
sources in order to make a projection of how China will possibly fare and
behave in its second ascent:
(a) China’s behavior during its First Rise (713-1820);
(b) What China learned in its century of humiliation; and
(c ) China’s recent behavior, following the end of the Cold War and
during the course of its present rise.
Two Main Reasons for the Wide Perception of a China Threat
There are two reasons why the world sees the rising China as a threat.
First is the bellicosity of Maoist China, which is still fresh in many people’
s minds. This is understandable, but it is not hard to pierce through this
myth, because much of Maoist China’s fury and obstinacy, as demonstrated
in its international behavior, was brought on by its exclusion from much
of world affairs. For thirty years after its birth, the People’s Republic
of China was denied diplomatic recognition by the United States and many
of its allies, and was kept out of the United Nations as well.
But, once Sino-U.S. relations were normalized, Maoist China’s international
behavior turned normal and less belligerent. At the United Nations, it took
a low profile after assuming the China seat, as one of the five Permanent
Members (or P-5) of the U.N. Security Council.
The second reason for the perceived China threat is due to lessons from
the history of international relations. Ever since the Congress of Westphalia
(1648), when the modern multi-state system began to take shape, every rising
power proved to be expansionist and predatory. Just look at these examples:
(1) Britain after the Industrial Revolution—built an empire on which the
sun would not set;
(2) Napoleonic France—embroiled the European continent in wars for two
decades; Japan after becoming a modern power in the wake of the Meiji Reform
– pavedthe way for Japanese aggression on the Asian Continent in late 19th
century and again in mid-20th century;
Germany, after Bismarck and mastery of the modern-weaponry technology –
initiated two most atrocious and horrendous world wars in human history;
(4) The Soviet Union under and since Stalin—brought on 40 years of Cold
War; and The United States after winning WWII – became the world’s
self-designated policemen. The senior President Bush, for example, sent
American troops (in 1989) to the sovereign state of Panama and forcibly
abducted its president, Manuel Noriega, back to the United States for trial.
The junior President Bush, on the other hand, launched wars on Afghanistan and
Iraq, in 2002 and 2003, respectively. The Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to
President Obama, it seems, just for not starting a war or its equivalent.
Bearing in mind the scary records of these examples, realist International-
Relations (IR) scholars concluded that unbalanced power, no matter who wields
it, is geopolitically destabilizing, hence a threat. People who rely on realist
IR theory are therefore skeptical whether China’s rise will be "peaceful."
One famous realist scholar even predicted that a war is almost certain in
the coming decades between the rising China and the United States, the incumbent
hegemonic power.
Nevertheless, if we examine the cases just mentioned, one thing stood
out in common: They were all FIRST TIME UPSTARTS （暴發戶）.
But, the rising China is different. It is not (and I repeat, NOT) a first-time
upstart. For over a thousand years (713 – 1820 A.D.), China was the world’
s largest economy and, hence, the most powerful nation on earth (Frank 1998:
52-150). What I term China’s ǒfirst riseō refers to this period of time.
In a minute, I will return to the question of how China will fare and behave
during its Second Rise. But, first, let’s dwell briefly on the meaning
and ramifications of China’s First Rise, so that we will be better prepared
to discuss its Second Rise.
China’s First Rise as Measured by GDP
For different reasons, neither the world nor China was very articulate
about China’s First Rise. The topic remained totally under-studied until
the rise of the globalist literature, featuring the work of a group of scholars
known as the ǒworld-systemō school. These globalist scholars urged that we
consider the world-system as a ǒwhole,ō of which all national economies
were integral parts (Wallersten 1974; Frank 1967, 1975).
From a global perspective, and utilizing aggregate data kept by
(Western) economic historians, these scholars found hard evidence to show that
for the first 18 centuries of the Christian era, it was Asia, not Europe, that
held the center stage (Frank 1998: xv; Mahbubani 2008: 49). Here, the term
Asia refers to China plus India.
Looking at China alone, these globalist scholars point out that China’
s total GDP was consistently more than the combined total of the entire
Europe, from year 1 A.D. to 1820 A.D. Relying on the data such as presented
by Angus Maddison (2007:379), they note that even as late as 1820, China’
s GDP was $228.6 billion (valued in 1990 dollars). It was still more than
Europe’s combined total of $184.7 billion (also in 1990 dollars). That
pattern was reversed only after 1840, when China’s economy was badly ruined
by the after-effects of its defeat in the Opium War. (That War, you recall,
resulted from the British endeavors to ram opium down the Chinese throat.)
Science and Technology
Skeptics may question China’s alleged lack of scientific and
technological accomplishments during its first rise. Well, it only takes a
little digging to find a few often-neglected indicators:
*In the 11th century, for example, China already had mass production. Early
in that century, Chinese government arsenals manufactured more than 16 million
identical iron arrowheads a year.
*The 13th century already saw the rise of mechanized production in China.
For example, machines in north China, powered by belt transmissions off
a waterwheel, twisted a rough rope of hemp-fibers into finer yarn. The machine
used 32 spinning heads rotating simultaneously (FEER 2000:4).
Thus, the Chinese economy, early on during its first rise, had already developed
the two key elements of what we usually associate with the Industrial Revolution:
(a) mass production and (b) mechanized production. China had both, some
five centuries before the Industrial Revolution in the West.
Overseas Explorations
In the 15th century, departing from its land-bound tradition, China
launched a series of seven maritime expeditions under imperial patronage,
commanded by a trusted eunuch named Zheng Ho (鄭和). In these voyages
spanning 28 years (1405-1433 A.D.), Zheng Ho had under his command 250 mammoth
ships and 27,000 men, including professional soldiers (sailors?) and medical
and other personnel. According to a recent study by an American author (Edward
Dreyer 2007), Zheng Ho’s fleet was comparable to the major fleets in much-later
Western history—such as the Spanish Armada of 1588, and the combined British,
French, and Spanish fleets at the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805.
A British submarine captain-turned naval historian, Gavin Menzies
(2005), found evidence that the Chinese group led by Zheng Ho was the first
humans to discover the Americas, in 1421 ---- or 71 years before Christopher
Columbus sailed into the New World. But in stark contrast to Western maritime
expansion, the Chinese group never established a single colony overseas. Nor
did they lay claims to any of the lands they discovered, including the Americas.
The goal of these maritime missions was unclear. But, judging by the inordinate
size of the ships, author Dreyer determined the goal was to enforce the
Chinese tribute system on the countries in the Indian Ocean. [Under the
tribute system, foreign rulers or their envoys would come to China and present
tribute in local products to the Chinese emperor, thus acknowledging his
unique status as the Son of Heaven and ruler of the Middle Kingdom of lands
directly under Heaven. They would receive, in return, gifts from the Chinese
Emperor, symbolizing his imperial recognition of the status of the tribute-
bearing states and their rulers.]
After Zheng Ho’s maritime missions, the tribute system was extended,
through east and southeast Asia, all the way to as far as the Indian Ocean
states.
Of special interest here is that this tribute system also constituted what
one Japanese scholar, Hamashita (1988, 1994), called a regional economic
system. Its existence symbolized the recognition by all other states within
the tribute system of China’s suzerain status, during a time span of 11
centuries (the 7th through the early 19th centuries).
So, the Chinese tribute system, in fact, constituted another system of
international relations outside the Westphalian system of states. A Korean
American professor, David Kang (2001), made a comparative and quantitative
study of this peculiar Sinocentric Asian system of international relations,
over a six-century period, ending in the 19th century. He found it to manifest
two distinct differences with the Euro-centric system of international relations
in comparable times. First, he found, the Sino-centric system of international
relations was characterized by formal hierarchy but informal equality. Second,
it had far fewer wars than the Eurocentric system. In addition, and more
important for our purpose here, he found that bandwagoning, not balancing,
was the rule of the game played by the tributary (i.e., lesser) states.
To sum up thus far: We have seen how truly advanced China was during its
First Rise, in terms of both its economic power and accomplishments in science
and technology. We also noted China’s amazing maritime capability as seen
in Zheng Ho’s seven seafaring expeditions. These and the wide trade contacts
it maintained with what the Globalist scholar Andre Gunder Frank (1998) called
an Eurasian-African world market system should correct the usual image of
pre-modern China as a reclusive, self-centered, and even backward country.
But, most important of all, even during China’s First Rise, stretching
over 11 centuries, China did not grab anybody’s land, nor did it commit
aggression against any country. This record can be verified by examining
the histories of China’s neighboring countries -- provided you don’t mistake
Genghis Khan to be Chinese. He was Mongolian, and his grandson Kublai even
conquered China and established the Yuan (or Mongolian) dynasty in 13th-century
China (1260-1368).
Most discussions about the currently rising China that you and I are witnessing
today, usually, begin with the typical opening line like: "China has in
three decades risen from a perennially poor and stagnant country to become
an economic power-house to be reckoned with . . . .". But, as we have seen
thus far, that is the wrong way to begin in discussing China.
An Evaluation of China During Its First Rise
AS we have seen, the available records on China’s First Rise show that
it did NOT abuse its power. Of the several reasons that I can think of,
the most crucial one was cultural. Confucius taught the Chinese to win people’
s hearts by suasion and exemplification (wangdao 王道)，not by coercion or
threat of force (badao, 霸道)。
Keep this Chinese tradition of non-abuse of power in mind, and we will
be better able to speculate, below, on what will be the likely behavior
of China in its second rise. But, first, a few words about what China has
learned from its intervening century of prostration and humiliation at the
hands of Western ǒimperialists,ō who came to prey on the Chinese in the
19th century.
What China Learned During Its Century of Eclipse
Many Chinese today are still smarting under the brutal wounds and
discomfitures that visited upon their country, stemming from the inroads of a
West that did not hesitate about abusing its power--- during much of the 19
century though the early part of the 20th century. If you ever visited the
ruined Yuan Ming Yuan Palace, near Beijing, which still bears the scars of
brutal sackings by Western forces, you will understand what I am referring to.
Nevertheless, if there was one thing that the Chinese nation learned from
its ordeals with imperialist encroachments, it was a yearning for justice
in world affairs, or empathy for the world’s underdogs. We can find evidence
for this in one important, but little-known, historical episode.
The only place where the word ǒjusticeō is inscribed into the operative
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, is in Article 2(3). And,
that was inserted into the original draft at the insistence of the Chinese
government in 1944. Under the provision of Article 2(3), all members of the
United Nations are required to settle their international disputes by peaceful
means, so that --and I quote-- ǒpeace and security, and justice, will not
be endangered.ō --Unquote.
As one of the victor powers at the end of WWII, China participated in
the drafting of the Charter for the future United Nations. The original draft
coming out of the Dumbarton Oaks conference (known as the Dumbarton Oaks
Proposals) did not contain the word "justiceō after the words ǒpeace and
security."
China was one of the four countries that took part in the making of the
Dumbarton Oaks Proposals in 1944; the others being the United States, Britain,
and the Soviet Union (the French government was in exile). Out of this
group, only China had endured the crushing blows of imperialist encroachments,
resulting from the abuse of power by Western countries.
When the draft was sent back to China for approval, the Chinese
Government, reacting from China’s own experience, reasoned that any settlement
of international disputes that was without consideration for justice could
easily be an imposition of the wills of the powerful over the weak. Thus, the
Chinese Government instructed its envoy, Ambassador Wellington Koo, to insist
that the word ǒjusticeō be inserted into Article 2(3). Hence, you have the
present wording in that article, with ǒand justiceō inserted after the phrase of
"peace and security," as if it was an afterthought. Indeed, it was an
afterthought, added at China’s behest (cf. China Institute 1956, Chapter 1).
Projections into the Future?
If we cannot divine the future, at least we can make a projection on the
basis of China’s behavioral patterns that can be generalized from three
sources suggested earlier, namely: (a) the track record of China’s First
Rise, as already discussed; (b) the impact of the lessons that China learned
during its century of humiliation, as also noted above; and (c) China’s
behavior since the beginning of its current ascent.
Thus far, we have noted two distinct characteristics in China’s
international behavior. One is China’s tradition of not abusing its power on
others, even when it was the world’s most powerful state, during its First
Rise. The second distinct feature came from China’s century of humiliation in
that it has become exceptionally keen on the need for international social
justice. As a short hand, we may call this China’s anti-social Darwinism.
We are now ready to examine China’s behavioral pattern during its
steady rise in the last three decades. I’d like to call attention to two
tell-tale signs in the way China has conducted itself in the most recent years.
China’s Behavioral Patterns in the Run-Up to Its 2nd Rise
(I) First, contrary to the predictions of many distinct realist analysts
(e.g., Waltz 2000: 28), the rising China has not done anything to counter-
balance the sole-surviving American superpower Instead of balancing the United
States. Instead, China has been playing a bandwagoning game (Van Ness 2002:133).
Let me use the North Korean case as a handy illustration. Under similar
circumstances, Stalin probably would have manipulated the erratic, and swash-
buckling North Korea as a pawn in his rivalry with Washington. In contrast,
China, complying with the wishes of Uncle Sam, has brokered the Six-Party Talks,
as a way to rein in North Korea.
Another example: I have heard an un-confirmed report about how China
complied with the wishes of the United States in the complex tangle involving
what can be done to contain Iran. In order to play down the importance of
Iran’s oil, Washington secretly urged Saudi Arabia to increase its oil
production.
But, when Saudi Arabia over-produced and found not enough buyers for the
glut of its oil product, Washington turned to Beijing for help, even though
China was unwilling to support any move in the U.N. Security Council to
condemn and sanction Iran. Guess what? China obligingly bought up all the
stock of the surplus Saudi oil. Again, Stalin, or anyone bent on counter-
balancing the United States, would not have played the bandwagoning game that
China did.
I expect the spirit that shaped China’s bandwagoning behavior as such
to continue. The same non-obtrusive and obliging spirit will most likely
guide the Chinese approach to a new world order, in the era of Pax Sinica.
(II) Secondly, studies have shown that China has stepped up its participation
in the United Nations peace-keeping operations (known as PKO) in recent
years. Of the five Permanent Members (P-5) of the U.N. Security Council,
China in 2009 was only behind France in the size of the forces contributed
to PKO operations. In one case that I know, a Chinese general (Major General
Zhao Jingmin) was appointed to be the force commander of the U.N. mission
in Western Sahara. As one writer points out, what is significant is that
China has no resource interest in Western Sahara. And, it is IMAGE-- not
material interest -- that was behind the Chinese involvement (Bates and Huang
2009). After conducting interviews in China, another writer, a Japanese
scholar, suggested that growing involvement in PKO operations has allowed
Beijing to ǒcultivate the image of a responsible great power, and cultivate
the image of a state which protects international peaceō (Suzuki 2008: 56;
emphasis added). Instead of ǒImage,ō I would suggest that it is a commitment
to the welfare of the world’s ǒunderdogsō that was behind China’s participation.
It is a commitment born of empathy for the world’s underdogs, spoken of
earlier. I expect this kind of commitment to continue during the age of
Pax Sinica.
Implications of China’s Second Rise
Somebody (Martin Jacques) wrote a very popular book entitled: When China
Rules the World. And, it has a very long but telling subtitle: ǒThe End
of the Western World and the Birth of a New World Order.ō I say ǒtellingō
because, undoubtedly, it reflects the typical Western scare about China’
s un-stoppable ascent. But, I have two objections to the wording of the title.
My first objection is that in China’s Second Rise, it will not ǒruleō
the world -- if to rule, in the Western lexicon, means ǒto dominateō or
ǒto dictateō to the world. My second objection is to the suggestion that
China’s rise spells the ǒend of the Western world.ō Decidedly, it will
not. Nevertheless, I accept that China’s second rise will see the ǒbirth
of a new world order,ō as the book’s subtitle has it. But, the kind of new
world order that I foresee will, definitely, be different from what the author
of the book has in mind.
________________________________________
In a recent speech to show-case President Obama’s foreign policy,
Hillary Clinton, the American Secretary of State, emphatically declared: "The
United States can, must, and will lead in this century.ō The New York Times
(Sept. 8, 2010, p. 8) described the Hillary speech, delivered at the Council for
Foreign Relations, as ǒan unalloyed statement of powerō. A re-rising China,
I belief, will not compete with the United States for leadership in this
fashion. True to its belief in leading by exemplification, China would most
likely sit earnestly by and watch which side the rest of the world will flock
to, the American side, or the Chinese side. To ǒrule by not trying,ō as taught
by Lao Tzu (Laozi), is consistent with the Confucian idea of leading by
exemplification, more so than meets the eye.
The New World Order To Rise from China’s 2nd Rise
I see China’s Second Rise to superpower status will go through two
stages. First, China will overtake the United States in economic clout, as
measured by GDP, no later than 2035 (John Naisbitt, the American futurologist
put it at 2020). Second, China will catch up with the United States in military
might, in another 20 years -- if not longer-- further down the road. (Given
the fact that China’s 1.3 billion population is over four times that of
the United States, it may take even longer for its per capita income to
match the United States.)
I see the interim, between the two stages, as the most unstable and
troubled period. The reason is that the United States, out of fears of losing
its hegemonic leverage, will most likely be tempted to try exceedingly hard
to slow down -- even sabotage -- China’s race to the top -- regardless of
Chinese intensions. I hope, though, that discussions like this will contribute
to our understanding of China’s likely preferred leadership style. And
improved understanding, I hope, will relieve some of Washington’s fear,
when confronted with China’s inevitable rise.
Let me return to the new world order that is most likely to take shape
with China’s Second Rise. For obvious reasons, we can only foresee a rough
sketch of it.
*In the first place, with its ascent, China will move from a great
power to a global power. A global power is one that possesses what Susan
Strange (1987) calls a ǒstructural powerō edge over other states. That means
China will figure prominently in four different structures, namely: structures
of security, production, credit and finance, and, finally, R & D. However,
until it reaches a per capita GDP on a par with the United States, and beats
the latter in military and technological capability, China will not be in
command of unmatched power in all four structures.
People may worry about the Chinese tradition of state interventionism in
the economy, and its international repercussions. But, judging by its past
record, even from the Maoist times, China is not likely to reverse its policy
of NOT exporting revolution, or preaching to others its own collectivist
values. (Copycat self-designated ǒMaoistsō springing up in different places
such as in Sri Lanka, in the past, were not exports from China.) And, I
have great confidence in the existing liberal, free-trade institutions of
the world, like the WTO, the Bretton Woods system, the global governance
regime over finance (such as the Basel regime, the IOSCO, and the BIS),
etc. I don’t think China, as a beneficiary of these institutions and regimes,
will be so foolish as to rock the boat and risk sinking it.
*The real difference, I think, will probably be found in China’s
strategic posture and approach to global and regional order. In this connection,
the most distinct difference is China’s propensity for multilateralism and
its professed objection to unipolarity-ism. True to the Chinese cultural
embrace of inclusivism, the world is too large for just one leader alone.
In that context, China will probably prefer to preside over, rather than
single-handedly lead, the world. Typical of the Chinese avoidance of legal
formalism, China will rely more on informal agreements than rigid treaties
in its conduct of international relations. To Hillary Clinton’s motto of
leading the world by the American ǒprimacy of might," the Chinese will probably
respond by saying ǒleading by suasion and exemplification," and, in addition,
"leading by not ostentatiously trying to lead." That is the Chinese way.
I have a sense that as China moves forward to the top, its leaders will
heed more to traditional Chinese teachings of statecraft. If they try to
imitate the style of the ancient Chinese sage-kings, however, they will
soon find it impractical. To the ancient sage-kings, the motto -- if we
can paraphrase it in English -- would be ǒto rule without trying to lead
is the key to ruling par excellenceō (無為方能無所不為), as best enunciated
by Lao Tzu (Laozi)。Yet, the ancient sage kings could do so, only because
they were ruling a primitive society with a small population that lived a
very simple idyllic life and had very simple institutions. Above all, ancient
societies had very few demands on their rulers. But, the reality of today’
s world is totally different. Today’s world demands a hands-on leadership.
In the era of Pax Sinica, however, China is most likely to live out its
frustrations with two previous predators, namely: Western imperialism and
Stalinist-type chauvinism. It will rise to the call for international justice,
recalling the role that China played in inserting the term ǒjusticeō into
the U.N. Charter, as discussed above. And, it will stand in opposition to
the Western notion (and practice) of social Darwinism, which provided the
justification for the ǒWhiteman’s burdenō in the past. And it will be equally
opposed to the Soviet notion of ǒproletarian internationalism,ō which meant,
in the heydays of Soviet power, that the Soviet Union had the right to ride
herd on its followers in the Soviet bloc. At the practical level, ǒjusticeō
will encompass social justice, showing empathy for the ǒunderdogsō in the
world.
This Chinese posture, wittingly or unwittingly, will be in keeping with
the Confucian teaching of wangdao, staying away from leading by coercion
or intimidation. Let’s recall that, in 1995, the Chinese Communist Party
began to celebrate Confucius’ birthday. Since then, Confucius and Confucian
teachings have come back with a vengeance. The Confucian Analects is taught
from the first grade in primary school up. And, it is expounded on CCTV
national television.
At home, China, under socialism, will practice disciplined centralism.
But internationally, it will practice anti-Chauvinism as well as anti-social
Darwinism. One tell-tale clue is China’s policy toward North Korea. As
Drew Thompson (2010) noted, despite its nearly total dependence on China
for its sustenance and even survival, North Korea is treated by China as
a ǒgood neighbor,ō but not as a client or satellite. (Stalin’s Soviet
Union would never treat North Korea this way).
Acting out of self-confidence, and in conformity with its preference for
leading without ostentatiously trying to lead, China may eventually learn
to let international law and institutions play a more prominent role. If
disputes, and even conflicts, can be resolved by reference to international
law, and by judicial settlement, then the Chinese superpower will not have
to act as the ultimate arbitrator. This leadership style will stand in contrast
to the habitual interventionist reflex of past hegemonic powers, their rhetoric
to the contrary notwithstanding. If China is true to its anti-social Darwinism
convictions, it will learn to stay clear of the power play of past hegemonic
leaders.
Studies have shown that in recent years, China has demonstrated
increasing interest in U.N. peace-keeping (or PKO) operations-- several of which
involved a human rights component (e.g., El Salvador). It even participated in
U.N. debates on the implementation of the R2P (the right to protect) of the
world community (Welsh 2004; 2008). From this increasing Chinese participation
has emerged a prudent, balanced approach to international governance (Bates
and Huang 2009). While China supported, in principle, humanitarian intervention
for the protection of the security and rights of the native population in
failed states (such as Somalia), it also called for strengthening the capacity
of these governments, so that they would be better able to take care of
the rights of their own people at home. A distinct Chinese style was its
preference to rely more on private exhortation than on outright condemnation.
On another front, the same Chinese prudent and balanced approach applies
equally to concerns about the environment. To the Chinese, while environment-
control responsibilities are incumbent on all states, the sovereign right
of a state to develop internally should likewise be recognized.
In the age of Pax Sinica, China will most likely stand for an
equilibrium in two sets of ideals:
It will show equal respect for state sovereignty and the primacy of certain
community concerns (such as the environment and the global commons); and
It will support harmony within diversity, while emphasizing the centrality
of certain overriding community goals and interests (such as peace and security;
poverty reduction; spread of education; fight on AIDS; ban on weapons of
mass destruction, and fight on terrorism and on trafficking in drugs and
in women for prostitution, etc.).
Thus far, as is shown in its active role in the world community’s fight
to control the African HIV/AIDS crisis, China has proven to be more than
a by-stander for the liberal international order. Its empathy for the HIV/AIDS
victims has catapulted China into active participation, in concert with other
major powers, in the global health governance efforts (Chan 2010). Looking
into the future, this cautious posture will likely underline China’s approach
to international governance in all issue areas, from the initial stage of
Pax Sinica onward.
Moreover, for a guide to world peace under Pax Sinica, China is most likely
to revive the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, first formulated
by Premier Zhou Enlai with India’s Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, back
in 1954 (Hsiung 1972: 32ff). In the governance of the world’s finance and
trade, the G-20 will probably outshine the G-7 as a ǒBoard of Directorsō
in global governance. But, G-20 will not displace the Bretton Woods system
(the IMF, the World Bank, etc.) or the World Trade Orgaization (WTO). Typical
of the Chinese deference to precedents set by one’s predecessor (known
in Chinese as xiaogui caosui, 蕭規曹隨), China as the succeeding superpower
is not expected to drastically supplant these post-WWII institutions born
of what is known as the liberal theory of peace. The theory consists of
two arguments: (1) Free trade substantially reduces the number of targets
against which force might be applied in the pursuit of state interest (cf.
Knorr 1973: 196; Keohane and Nye 1977: 28); and (2) Free trade increases
the vulnerability of actors because of their increased interdependence,
making them disinclined to entertain the risks of resorting to force (Keohane
and Nye 1977: 28-29; Tucker 1977: 174-175; Gilpin 1975: 227). Both the Bretton
Woods System and the GATT/WTO regime epitomize the free-trade and
non-protectionist spirit of this liberal theory of peace. In practical terms, if
values and resources can be freely exchanged or obtained from the international
free market, nations have no reason to go to war to obtain the same at much
higher costs. In the three decades since the Dengist reform started in 1978,
China has got itself so deeply entrenched into this post-WWII free-trade system
that it has created what Richard Rosecrance (2006) calls a ǒvulnerability
interdependenceō with the United States, EU members, Japan, and others.
If it seeks to undermine the existing system, it will almost amount to a
suicidal coup. It is, therefore, highly unlikely that China will destroy
the system in which it already has so much at stake.
Regional Implications under Pax Sinica
At the regional level, the shape of the regions as they exist today will
most likely survive, but under the influence of geoeconomics states will
find themselves more entangled in a labyrinthine network of free-trade
associations (FTAs), including cross-regional ones. In the Pacific Asian region,
China will probably feel most comfortable playing the role of the exalted
suzerain in an updated version of the Chinese tribute system from traditional
times.
And, let’s not forget the findings from Prof. David Kang’s study of the
traditional Chinese tribute system. As a system of international relations
unto itself, it had fewer wars than its Westphalian counterpart, in the
six centuries he studied. The Chinese avoidance of formal rigid arrangements
will match the ASEAN’s informal approach to institutions. Thus, the Asian
regional building will be a process typified more by emphasis on camaraderie
than on rapid breakthroughs.
True to the Chinese preference for leading by suasion and exemplification,
three developments can be expected for the Asian region.
*First, China will probably draw an ever-increasing number of students
from the neighboring countries. Already, for instance, in 2009 China was
the destination for nearly 67-thousand South Korean students, almost as
many as the South Korean students that went to the United States for advanced
education. But, in the age of Pax Sinica, China will most likely draw many
more foreign students from near and far.
*Second, I expect China to be the linchpin, or anchor, but not
necessarily the hegemonic leader, of the enlarged Pacific Asian regional
grouping that is currently in the making. Known by its misnomer of East Asian
Summit (EAS), the grouping consists of the 10 members of ASEAN (or Association
for Southeast Asian Nations), plus the ǒinner 3ō states (including China,
South Korea, and Japan), and the ǒouter 3ō (Australia, New Zealand, and
India). In its current scheme of things, reflecting the aspirations of the
ASEAN, the United States is not included. But, with China’s ascent, I
have a feeling that, contrary to expectations, Beijing will be brokering
the incorporation of the United States in the EAS grouping. Why? Well,
for the same reason for which President Ma Ying-jeou in Taiwan co-opted
talents from opposing political parties to serve in his Government. This
is consistent with the Chinese notion of leading by inclusion, for the sake
of converting potential opponents into partners and, no less important,
of cultivating the image of a magnanimous leader -- that is, magnanimous,
as opposed to hegemonic, leader.
And, a good image is necessary for establishing China’s legitimacy and
acceptability to the rest of the world. With the addition of Russia, the
EAS (or whatever name it will have) will by then be comprised of 18 members.
Because of their dual membership in the Shanghai Cooperative Organization
(SCO), China and Russia will most likely serve as a cement between SCO and
the Pacific Asian regional grouping. With the inclusion of China, Japan,
the United States, and Russia, the EAS will be the largest trade bloc,
outshining both the EU and the NAFTA. As to the APEC (Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation forum), the current 21-member region-wide grouping, will face a
future of uncertainty.
* Last, but not least, the implications of Pax Sinica for Taiwan. Once
China is in the position as the reigning predominant power, its fear of
Taiwan going a separatist route will diminish. This is because Beijing knows
that in the age of geoeconomics, a resource-deficient Taiwan cannot go it
alone, but will be more attuned to the idea of integration with the mainland,
beginning with the economic domain. In its present status, Taiwan is not
part of any regional free-trade networking arrangement, except for its
membership in the APEC. But, with the uncertain fate befalling APEC itself, as
noted above, Taiwan will find its isolation threatening to its survival. Hence,
both its fear of exclusion and the steep hierarchy in the region’s power
structure will make Taiwan, like other regional actors, turn bandwagoning
to mainland China. Taiwan will find playing this game a sine qua non for
its survival. In the age of deepening geoeconomics, Taiwan will find, economic
security will outweigh the traditional concerns of political autonomy and
military security (i.e., national defense).
Already, even during the present run-up to China’s Second Rise, we are
witnessing signs of the region’s states playing bandwagoning to China--and,
all this is happening despite U.S. attempts to contain China by building
new coalitions within the region. Two examples will suffice to document this
trend. First, despite Washington’s attempt to corral Vietnam as an ally
to isolate China, the Vietnamese Deputy Defense Minister (Nguyen Chi Wing)
declared during his visit in Beijing, on August 25, 2010, that his country,
Vietnam, would never ( I repeat ǒneverō) be in an alliance with the United
States. Instead, he said ǒVietnam would à want China to play a greater à
non-traditional security roleō in Southeast Asia, where China has more experience.
By "non-traditional security role," he was referring to China’s lead
in the Sino-ASEAN cooperation in the suppression of piracy, smuggling, human
trafficking, drug trade, transnational criminal organizations, illegal
immigration, cyber-piracy and cyber attacks, terrorism, subversion, etc. (Arase
2010: 809).
The timing of the Vietnamese official’s statement is particularly noteworthy.
It came one month after Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made an offer
of U.S. help to mediate ASEAN’s South China Sea disputes with China, and
just two weeks after the United States announced a joint maritime exercise
with Vietnam to be held in the South China Sea. The other example concerns
Australia. During Secretary Clinton’s visit in Australia, in March 2009,
her Australian counterpart told her, point-blank, that Australia would not
be interested in joining the United States in a coalition against China.
After the U.S.-South Korean joint maritime exercise in July 25-28 on the
Japan Sea off the coast of North Korea, and amidst talks of more such exercises
in the Yellow Sea near China’s Beijing-Tianjin nerve center, the Australian
navy joined the Chinese navy in a maritime exercise in the Yellow Sea, on
September 23. The exercise tested joint search-and-rescue missions. Using
live ammunitions and flying targets, it tested artillery targeting and
intercepting capability of the participating ships. I expect this trend of the
region’s states bandwagoning to China to continue as its power edge in the
broad Pacific Asia region further expands. In steep hierarchy, to reiterate,
lesser states will bandwagon, rather than balancing the predominant state.
Furthermore, Taiwan will know that, given a different power ratio between
China and the United States in the age of Pax Sinica, the U.S. factor as
a road-block to cross-Strait relations will recede to the background. If
Taiwan is wise, it will learn not to alienate mainland China, and that, instead,
gravitating toward it will be in Taiwan’s interest. It’s important to
note that in a recent poll, 63% of the people polled in Taiwan said they
did NOT think that a rising, powerful China will necessarily be a threat
to Taiwan’s security. (Parenthetically, if the opposition DPP continues
its opposition to closer ties with the mainland, it will lose its support
among Taiwan’s voters.)
Earlier this year (June 29, 2010), Taiwan and the mainland signed an
agreement known by its acronym ECFA, which stands for Economic Cooperation
Framework Agreement. In the few months after its signing, Taiwan was able to
draw as much as US$400-billion in foreign investments from various foreign
sources. With the ECFA in place, foreign investors in Taiwan have an added
advantage of ready access to mainland Chinese markets. To Taiwan, ECFA is a
life-saver during the present global economic crisis. I expect more such
ECFA-like initiatives to come from mainland China as inducements to Taiwan for
closer integration, beginning for example with a customs union and maybe a
common market to follow. In public-opinion polls, 70% of the people in Taiwan
supported ECFA; and 73% said they would like to move to the mainland in search
of jobs.
According to a September 19 report of BERI, a business risk rating firm,
post-ECFA Taiwan now ranks No. 4 on the list of the best trade and investment
places in Asia. As such, Taiwan beats Japan, mainland China, and South Korea,
which ranked Nos. 6, 15, and 18, respectively. All this augurs well for
future cross-Strait relations.
Another thing most likely to happen is that an ever-increasing number of
Taiwan students will receive an open arm from schools and institutions of
higher learning in mainland China. It is logical to expect the coming
generations of mainland-educated Taiwan students to be the future catalysts for
closer integration between the two sides across the Taiwan Strait.
In the same spirit of inclusivism, and as cross-Strait mutual trust
improves, Beijing can reasonably be expected to take another initiative, which
will make its relations with Taiwan more palatable and oriented toward the
direction of ǒsocial harmony,ō as pronounced by Hu Jintao some time ago. But, it
will happen quietly, and without pressure mounted by anyone, either from Taiwan
or any other source. I am referring to the quiet removal, on Beijing’s
own accord, of the 1,000 mainland missiles cumulatively re-targeted at Taiwan
since the days of estrangement during the eight-year presidency of Chen
Shui-bian. The reason is that cross-Strait relations will be no longer bedeviled
by the high tension and mutual distrust spawned by Chen Shui-bian’s separatist
policies in Taiwan. And, to reiterate, mainland China will be less worried
about Taiwan seeking a separatist existence—especially if political changes
within mainland China should make its system more compatible with Taiwan’
s political institutions.
I don’t want to suggest that the cross-Strait relations will be all roses.
All I am saying is that in the days of Pax Sinica, mainland China will approach
Taiwan with greater confidence. China will realize that its image will be
very different if it acts with civility and compassion. And, Taiwan, if it
acts rationally, will find it to its own advantage to respond positively
in kind. Nevertheless, in my reckoning, reunification is not likely unless
two conditions are ripe: First, the per capita income of the 1.3 billion
people on the mainland matches, or even surpasses, that of Taiwan’s 23
million. Second, internal changes on the mainland have led to the emergence
of a system palatable to the constituency in Taiwan. Both these conditions
will help eradicate the awesome fright with which the majority of Taiwan’
s population is seized for the ǒcolossusō across the Taiwan Strait.
A Happy Note and a Caveat
I want to end this talk on a happy note and with a big caveat. The
happy note is that according to a most recent poll, released by the Chicago
World Affairs Council on September 16, 2010, only 43% of the American
respondents felt that the rising China would be a threat to the United States,
if it should end up being a world-class major power. This is 10 points below the
finding of ten years ago. In addition, 68% believed that the United States
should cultivate a friendly and cooperative relationship with China, although
58% thought that Washington ought to align with Japan and South Korea to
contain China.
The caveat is that all I have said above, regarding what a Pax Sinica
may look like, will be nullified in the event some third country should
deliberately take calculated sabotaging actions to provoke a disaster or incite
China to over-react – very much like what Japan did in its recent provocative
action in the waters surrounding Dioyutai, an island the title to which is
in dispute between China and Japan. On September 9, three heavily armed
Japanese Coast-Guard ships surrounded a tiny Chinese fishing vessel peacefully
plying its trade, while sailing in what its crew believed to be within the
territorial waters (or the exclusive economic zone) of a Chinese island.
After twice colliding with the Chinese fishing vessel, the Japanese arrested
its skipper, holding him hostage for as long as he did not admit to his
ǒcrime.ō In the meantime, Japanese media announced that Japan would conduct
a joint military exercise with the United States naval forces. Dubbed ǒOperation
Retaking Diaoyutai,ō the announced joint exercise was reportedly targeted
at China as the imagined ǒenemyō that had forcibly captured the island.
Provocative actions like these may sound like a scenario for an exciting
movie. But they are destined to force China to react, even over-react, against
its best wishes. More important, they will render all my predictions, regarding
a peaceful Pax Sinica, totally irrelevant.
Concluding Remarks
I have two concluding remarks to make. First, if there is any way to sum
up what I have said about the multiple implications of China’s second ascent,
it should be that a re-rising China should be considered more as a new
ǒoptionō than an alternative to what is pre-existing. Hence, unlike what
Martin Jacques says in his book, China’s re-rise will not spell the ǒend
of the West," but will decidedly usher in a ǒnew world order."
Second, as I said, even though nobody has a definitive answer on how
China will fare and behave in its second ascent, I promised I would try to offer
a way by which a reasonably adequate answer can be deduced from existing
evidence. Such is the job of a professor, and I hope I have proven my
professorial credentials. Thank you.
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Text of a talk in Hong Kong, hosted by the China Energy Fund Committee,
October 20, 2020.
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