China’s Second Rise: Implications for
Global/Regional Order (& Taiwan)


by Professor James C. Hsiung (New York University)



 
Intro
	This talk is premised on the following two assumptions: 
That the momentum of China’s becoming the next predominant power is 
unstoppable; the question is when it will happen; and
That the United States (and many others) will continue to be apprehensive 
of the so-called "China threat."
I will address the intriguing question of whether the rising China is going 
to be a threat. As a professor should do, instead of making wild predictions,
 I will try to show a way (or, a methodology) whereby a reasonably adequate 
answer can be derived.   In doing so, we will draw upon the following three 
sources in order to make a projection of how China will possibly fare and 
behave in its second ascent:

	(a) China’s behavior during its First Rise (713-1820);
	(b) What China learned in its century of humiliation; and
	(c ) China’s recent behavior, following the end of the Cold War and 
		during the course of its present rise.   

Two Main Reasons for the Wide Perception of a China Threat

	There are two reasons why the world sees the rising China as a threat. 
First is the bellicosity of Maoist China, which is still fresh in many people’
s minds. This is understandable, but it is not hard to pierce through this 
myth, because much of Maoist China’s fury and obstinacy, as demonstrated 
in its international behavior, was brought on by its exclusion from much 
of world affairs. For thirty years after its birth, the People’s Republic 
of China was denied diplomatic recognition by the United States and many 
of its allies, and was kept out of the United Nations as well. 
But, once Sino-U.S. relations were normalized, Maoist China’s international 
behavior turned normal and less belligerent. At the United Nations, it took 
a low profile after assuming the China seat, as one of the five Permanent 
Members (or P-5) of the U.N. Security Council. 

	The second reason for the perceived China threat is due to lessons from 
the history of international relations. Ever since the Congress of Westphalia 
(1648), when the modern multi-state system began to take shape, every rising 
power proved to be expansionist and predatory.  Just look at these examples: 
 
(1) Britain after the Industrial Revolution—built an empire on which the 
sun would not set; 
(2) Napoleonic France—embroiled the European continent in wars for two
decades; Japan after becoming a modern power in the wake of the Meiji Reform 
– pavedthe way for Japanese aggression on the Asian Continent in late 19th
century and again in mid-20th century;
Germany, after Bismarck and mastery of the modern-weaponry technology –
 initiated two most atrocious and horrendous world wars in human history; 
 
(4) The Soviet Union under and since Stalin—brought on 40 years of Cold
 War; and The United States after winning WWII – became the world’s 
self-designated policemen. The senior President Bush, for example, sent 
American troops (in 1989) to the sovereign state of Panama and forcibly 
abducted its president, Manuel Noriega, back to the United States for trial. 
The junior President Bush, on the other hand, launched wars on Afghanistan and 
Iraq, in 2002 and 2003, respectively.  The Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to 
President Obama, it seems, just for not starting a war or its equivalent. 

Bearing in mind the scary records of these examples, realist International-
Relations (IR) scholars concluded that unbalanced power, no matter who wields 
it, is geopolitically destabilizing, hence a threat.  People who rely on realist 
IR theory are therefore skeptical whether China’s rise will be "peaceful."
One famous realist scholar even predicted that a war is almost certain in 
the coming decades between the rising China and the United States, the incumbent
hegemonic power. 

	Nevertheless, if we examine the cases just mentioned, one thing stood 
out in common:  They were all FIRST TIME UPSTARTS (暴發戶).
But, the rising China is different.  It is not (and I repeat, NOT) a first-time 
upstart. For over a thousand years (713 – 1820 A.D.), China was the world’
s largest economy and, hence, the most powerful nation on earth (Frank 1998: 
52-150). What I term China’s ǒfirst riseō refers to this period of time. 

In a minute, I will return to the question of how China will fare and behave 
during its Second Rise. But, first, let’s dwell briefly on the meaning 
and ramifications of China’s First Rise, so that we will be better prepared 
to discuss its Second Rise. 

China’s First Rise as Measured by GDP
	
	For different reasons, neither the world nor China was very articulate 
about China’s First Rise. The topic remained totally under-studied until 
the rise of the globalist literature, featuring the work of a group of scholars 
known as the ǒworld-systemō school. These globalist scholars urged that we 
consider the world-system as a ǒwhole,ō of which all national economies 
were integral parts (Wallersten 1974; Frank 1967, 1975). 

	From a global perspective, and utilizing aggregate data kept by 
(Western) economic historians, these scholars found hard evidence to show that
for the first 18 centuries of the Christian era, it was Asia, not Europe, that 
held the center stage (Frank 1998: xv; Mahbubani 2008: 49). Here, the term 
Asia refers to China plus India. 

	Looking at China alone, these globalist scholars point out that China’
s total GDP was consistently more than the combined total of the entire 
Europe, from year 1 A.D. to 1820 A.D.  Relying on the data such as presented 
by Angus Maddison (2007:379), they note that even as late as 1820, China’
s GDP was $228.6 billion (valued in 1990 dollars). It was still more than 
Europe’s combined total of $184.7 billion (also in 1990 dollars). That 
pattern was reversed only after 1840, when China’s economy was badly ruined 
by the after-effects of its defeat in the Opium War. (That War, you recall, 
resulted from the British endeavors to ram opium down the Chinese throat.) 

Science and Technology
	Skeptics may question China’s alleged lack of scientific and 
technological accomplishments during its first rise. Well, it only takes a
little digging to find a few often-neglected indicators:
*In the 11th century, for example, China already had mass production. Early 
in that century, Chinese government arsenals manufactured more than 16 million 
identical iron arrowheads a year.
*The 13th century already saw the rise of mechanized production in China. 
For example, machines in north China, powered by belt transmissions off 
a waterwheel, twisted a rough rope of hemp-fibers into finer yarn. The machine 
used 32 spinning heads rotating simultaneously (FEER 2000:4). 
Thus, the Chinese economy, early on during its first rise, had already developed 
the two key elements of what we usually associate with the Industrial Revolution: 
(a) mass production and (b) mechanized production. China had both, some 
five centuries before the Industrial Revolution in the West.

Overseas Explorations
	In the 15th century, departing from its land-bound tradition, China 
launched a series of seven maritime expeditions under imperial patronage, 
commanded by a trusted eunuch named Zheng Ho (鄭和). In these voyages 
spanning 28 years (1405-1433 A.D.), Zheng Ho had under his command 250 mammoth
ships and 27,000 men, including professional soldiers (sailors?) and medical 
and other personnel. According to a recent study by an American author (Edward 
Dreyer 2007), Zheng Ho’s fleet was comparable to the major fleets in much-later
Western history—such as the Spanish Armada of 1588, and the combined British,
 French, and Spanish fleets at the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805. 
	A British submarine captain-turned naval historian, Gavin Menzies 
(2005), found evidence that the Chinese group led by Zheng Ho was the first 
humans to discover the Americas, in 1421 ---- or 71 years before Christopher
Columbus sailed into the New World. But in stark contrast to Western maritime
expansion, the Chinese group never established a single colony overseas. Nor 
did they lay claims to any of the lands they discovered, including the Americas. 

The goal of these maritime missions was unclear. But, judging by the inordinate 
size of the ships, author Dreyer determined the goal was to enforce the 
Chinese tribute system on the countries in the Indian Ocean. [Under the 
tribute system, foreign rulers or their envoys would come to China and present 
tribute in local products to the Chinese emperor, thus acknowledging his 
unique status as the Son of Heaven and ruler of the Middle Kingdom of lands 
directly under Heaven. They would receive, in return, gifts from the Chinese 
Emperor, symbolizing his imperial recognition of the status of the tribute-
bearing states and their rulers.] 
	After Zheng Ho’s maritime missions, the tribute system was extended, 
through east and southeast Asia, all the way to as far as the Indian Ocean 
states. 
Of special interest here is that this tribute system also constituted what 
one Japanese scholar, Hamashita (1988, 1994), called a regional economic 
system. Its existence symbolized the recognition by all other states within 
the tribute system of China’s suzerain status, during a time span of 11 
centuries (the 7th through the early 19th centuries). 

	So, the Chinese tribute system, in fact, constituted another system of 
international relations outside the Westphalian system of states. A Korean 
American professor, David Kang (2001), made a comparative and quantitative 
study of this peculiar Sinocentric Asian system of international relations, 
over a six-century period, ending in the 19th century. He found it to manifest 
two distinct differences with the Euro-centric system of international relations 
in comparable times. First, he found, the Sino-centric system of international 
relations was characterized by formal hierarchy but informal equality. Second,
 it had far fewer wars than the Eurocentric system. In addition, and more 
important for our purpose here, he found that bandwagoning, not balancing, 
was the rule of the game played by the tributary (i.e., lesser) states.

To sum up thus far: We have seen how truly advanced China was during its 
First Rise, in terms of both its economic power and accomplishments in science 
and technology. We also noted China’s amazing maritime capability as seen 
in Zheng Ho’s seven seafaring expeditions. These and the wide trade contacts 
it maintained with what the Globalist scholar Andre Gunder Frank (1998) called 
an Eurasian-African world market system should correct the usual image of 
pre-modern China as a reclusive, self-centered, and even backward country. 

But, most important of all, even during China’s First Rise, stretching 
over 11 centuries, China did not grab anybody’s land, nor did it commit 
aggression against any country. This record can be verified by examining 
the histories of China’s neighboring countries -- provided you don’t mistake 
Genghis Khan to be Chinese. He was Mongolian, and his grandson Kublai even 
conquered China and established the Yuan (or Mongolian) dynasty in 13th-century 
China (1260-1368). 
 
Most discussions about the currently rising China that you and I are witnessing 
today, usually, begin with the typical opening line like: "China has in 
three decades risen from a perennially poor and stagnant country to become 
an economic power-house to be reckoned with . . . .".  But, as we have seen 
thus far, that is the wrong way to begin in discussing China.

An Evaluation of China During Its First Rise

  AS we have seen, the available records on China’s First Rise show that 
it did NOT abuse its power. Of the several reasons that I can think of, 
the most crucial one was cultural. Confucius taught the Chinese to win people’
s hearts by suasion and exemplification (wangdao 王道),not by coercion or 
threat of force (badao, 霸道)。
 
	Keep this Chinese tradition of non-abuse of power in mind, and we will 
be better able to speculate, below, on what will be the likely behavior 
of China in its second rise. But, first, a few words about what China has 
learned from its intervening century of prostration and humiliation at the 
hands of Western ǒimperialists,ō who came to prey on the Chinese in the 
19th century. 

What China Learned During Its Century of Eclipse

	Many Chinese today are still smarting under the brutal wounds and 
discomfitures that visited upon their country, stemming from the inroads of a 
West that did not hesitate about abusing its power--- during much of the 19 
century though the early part of the 20th century. If you ever visited the 
ruined Yuan Ming Yuan Palace, near Beijing, which still bears the scars of 
brutal sackings by Western forces, you will understand what I am referring to.
Nevertheless, if there was one thing that the Chinese nation learned from 
its ordeals with imperialist encroachments, it was a yearning for justice 
in world affairs, or empathy for the world’s underdogs.  We can find evidence 
for this in one important, but little-known, historical episode. 

	The only place where the word ǒjusticeō is inscribed into the operative 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, is in Article 2(3).  And, 
that was inserted into the original draft at the insistence of the Chinese 
government in 1944. Under the provision of Article 2(3), all members of the 
United Nations are required to settle their international disputes by peaceful 
means, so that --and I quote-- ǒpeace and security, and justice, will not 
be endangered.ō --Unquote.

	As one of the victor powers at the end of WWII, China participated in 
the drafting of the Charter for the future United Nations. The original draft
coming out of the Dumbarton Oaks conference (known as the Dumbarton Oaks 
Proposals) did not contain the word "justiceō after the words ǒpeace and 
security." 
China was one of the four countries that took part in the making of the 
Dumbarton Oaks Proposals in 1944; the others being the United States, Britain,
 and the Soviet Union (the French government was in exile). Out of this 
group, only China had endured the crushing blows of imperialist encroachments,
 resulting from the abuse of power by Western countries. 

	When the draft was sent back to China for approval, the Chinese 
Government, reacting from China’s own experience, reasoned that any settlement
of international disputes that was without consideration for justice could 
easily be an imposition of the wills of the powerful over the weak. Thus, the 
Chinese Government instructed its envoy, Ambassador Wellington Koo, to insist 
that the word ǒjusticeō be inserted into Article 2(3). Hence, you have the 
present wording in that article, with ǒand justiceō inserted after the phrase of 
"peace and security," as if it was an afterthought. Indeed, it was an 
afterthought, added at China’s behest (cf. China Institute 1956, Chapter 1).

Projections into the Future?

	If we cannot divine the future, at least we can make a projection on the 
basis of China’s behavioral patterns that can be generalized from three 
sources suggested earlier, namely: (a) the track record of China’s First 
Rise, as already discussed; (b) the impact of the lessons that China learned 
during its century of humiliation, as also noted above; and (c) China’s 
behavior since the beginning of its current ascent. 

	Thus far, we have noted two distinct characteristics in China’s 
international behavior. One is China’s tradition of not abusing its power on 
others, even when it was the world’s most powerful state, during its First 
Rise. The second distinct feature came from China’s century of humiliation in 
that it has become exceptionally keen on the need for international social 
justice. As a short hand, we may call this China’s anti-social Darwinism. 

	We are now ready to examine China’s behavioral pattern during its 
steady rise in the last three decades. I’d like to call attention to two 
tell-tale signs in the way China has conducted itself in the most recent years. 

China’s Behavioral Patterns in the Run-Up to Its 2nd Rise

	(I) First, contrary to the predictions of many distinct realist analysts
(e.g., Waltz 2000: 28), the rising China has not done anything to counter-
balance the sole-surviving American superpower Instead of balancing the United 
States. Instead, China has been playing a bandwagoning game (Van Ness 2002:133). 
Let me use the North Korean case as a handy illustration. Under similar 
circumstances,  Stalin probably would have manipulated the erratic, and swash-
buckling North Korea as a pawn in his rivalry with Washington. In contrast, 
China, complying with the wishes of Uncle Sam, has brokered the Six-Party Talks, 
as a way to rein in North Korea.  
	Another example:  I have heard an un-confirmed report about how China 
complied with the wishes of the United States in the complex tangle involving 
what can be done to contain Iran. In order to play down the importance of 
Iran’s oil, Washington secretly urged Saudi Arabia to increase its oil 
production.
 But, when Saudi Arabia over-produced and found not enough buyers for the 
glut of its oil product, Washington turned to Beijing for help, even though 
China was unwilling to support any move in the U.N. Security Council to 
condemn and sanction Iran. Guess what? China obligingly bought up all the 
stock of the surplus Saudi oil. Again, Stalin, or anyone bent on counter-
balancing the United States, would not have played the bandwagoning game that 
China did. 
	I expect the spirit that shaped China’s bandwagoning behavior as such 
to continue. The same non-obtrusive and obliging spirit will most likely 
guide the Chinese approach to a new world order, in the era of Pax Sinica. 

	(II) Secondly, studies have shown that China has stepped up its participation 
in the United Nations peace-keeping operations (known as PKO) in recent 
years. Of the five Permanent Members (P-5) of the U.N. Security Council, 
China in 2009 was only behind France in the size of the forces contributed 
to PKO operations. In one case that I know, a Chinese general (Major General 
Zhao Jingmin) was appointed to be the force commander of the U.N. mission 
in Western Sahara. As one writer points out, what is significant is that 
China has no resource interest in Western Sahara. And, it is IMAGE-- not 
material interest -- that was behind the Chinese involvement (Bates and Huang 
2009). After conducting interviews in China, another writer, a Japanese 
scholar, suggested that growing involvement in PKO operations has allowed 
Beijing to ǒcultivate the image of a responsible great power, and cultivate 
the image of a state which protects international peaceō (Suzuki 2008: 56; 
emphasis added). Instead of ǒImage,ō I would suggest that it is a commitment 
to the welfare of the world’s ǒunderdogsō that was behind China’s participation.

 It is a commitment born of empathy for the world’s underdogs, spoken of 
earlier. I expect this kind of commitment to continue during the age of 
Pax Sinica.

Implications of China’s Second Rise
	Somebody (Martin Jacques) wrote a very popular book entitled: When China 
Rules the World. And, it has a very long but telling subtitle: ǒThe End 
of the Western World and the Birth of a New World Order.ō  I say ǒtellingō 
because, undoubtedly, it reflects the typical Western scare about China’
s un-stoppable ascent. But, I have two objections to the wording of the title.
 My first objection is that in China’s Second Rise, it will not ǒruleō 
the world -- if to rule, in the Western lexicon, means ǒto dominateō or 
ǒto dictateō to the world. My second objection is to the suggestion that 
China’s rise spells the ǒend of the Western world.ō Decidedly, it will 
not. Nevertheless, I accept that China’s second rise will see the ǒbirth 
of a new world order,ō as the book’s subtitle has it. But, the kind of new 
world order that I foresee will, definitely, be different from what the author 
of the book has in mind. 
________________________________________
	In a recent speech to show-case President Obama’s foreign policy, 
Hillary Clinton, the American Secretary of State, emphatically declared: "The 
United States can, must, and will lead in this century.ō The New York Times 
(Sept. 8, 2010, p. 8) described the Hillary speech, delivered at the Council for 
Foreign Relations, as ǒan unalloyed statement of powerō.  A re-rising China, 
I belief, will not compete with the United States for leadership in this 
fashion. True to its belief in leading by exemplification, China would most 
likely sit earnestly by and watch which side the rest of the world will flock 
to, the American side, or the Chinese side. To ǒrule by not trying,ō as taught 
by Lao Tzu (Laozi), is consistent with the Confucian idea of leading by 
exemplification, more so than meets the eye. 

The New World Order To Rise from China’s 2nd Rise 
	I see China’s Second Rise to superpower status will go through two 
stages. First, China will overtake the United States in economic clout, as 
measured by GDP, no later than 2035 (John Naisbitt, the American futurologist 
put it at 2020).  Second, China will catch up with the United States in military 
might, in another 20 years -- if not longer-- further down the road. (Given 
the fact that China’s 1.3 billion population is over four times that of 
the United States, it may take even longer for its per capita income to 
match the United States.)

	I see the interim, between the two stages, as the most unstable and 
troubled period. The reason is that the United States, out of fears of losing 
its hegemonic leverage, will most likely be tempted to try exceedingly hard 
to slow down -- even sabotage -- China’s race to the top -- regardless of 
Chinese intensions. I hope, though, that discussions like this will contribute 
to our understanding of China’s likely preferred leadership style. And 
improved understanding, I hope, will relieve some of Washington’s fear, 
when confronted with China’s inevitable rise.

	Let me return to the new world order that is most likely to take shape 
with China’s Second Rise.  For obvious reasons, we can only foresee a rough 
sketch of it.

     *In the first place, with its ascent, China will move from a great 
power to a global power. A global power is one that possesses what Susan 
Strange (1987) calls a ǒstructural powerō edge over other states. That means 
China will figure prominently in four different structures, namely: structures 
of security, production, credit and finance, and, finally, R & D.  However, 
until it reaches a per capita GDP on a par with the United States, and beats 
the latter in military and technological capability, China will not be in 
command of unmatched power in all four structures.
 
People may worry about the Chinese tradition of state interventionism in 
the economy, and its international repercussions. But, judging by its past 
record, even from the Maoist times, China is not likely to reverse its policy 
of NOT exporting revolution, or preaching to others its own collectivist 
values. (Copycat self-designated ǒMaoistsō springing up in different places 
such as in Sri Lanka, in the past, were not exports from China.)  And, I 
have great confidence in the existing liberal, free-trade institutions of 
the world, like the WTO, the Bretton Woods system, the global governance 
regime over finance (such as the Basel regime, the IOSCO, and the BIS), 
etc. I don’t think China, as a beneficiary of these institutions and regimes,
 will be so foolish as to rock the boat and risk sinking it.  

	*The real difference, I think, will probably be found in China’s 
strategic posture and approach to global and regional order. In this connection, 
the most distinct difference is China’s propensity for multilateralism and 
its professed objection to unipolarity-ism. True to the Chinese cultural 
embrace of inclusivism, the world is too large for just one leader alone. 
In that context, China will probably prefer to preside over, rather than 
single-handedly lead, the world.  Typical of the Chinese avoidance of legal 
formalism, China will rely more on informal agreements than rigid treaties 
in its conduct of international relations. To Hillary Clinton’s motto of 
leading the world by the American ǒprimacy of might," the Chinese will probably 
respond by saying ǒleading by suasion and exemplification," and, in addition,
 "leading by not ostentatiously trying to lead." That is the Chinese way. 

I have a sense that as China moves forward to the top, its leaders will 
heed more to traditional Chinese teachings of statecraft. If they try to 
imitate the style of the ancient Chinese sage-kings, however, they will 
soon find it impractical.  To the ancient sage-kings, the motto -- if we 
can paraphrase it in English -- would be ǒto rule without trying to lead 
is the key to ruling par excellenceō (無為方能無所不為), as best enunciated 
by Lao Tzu (Laozi)。Yet, the ancient sage kings could do so, only because 
they were ruling a primitive society with a small population that lived a 
very simple idyllic life and had very simple institutions. Above all, ancient 
societies had very few demands on their rulers. But, the reality of today’
s world is totally different. Today’s world demands a hands-on leadership. 
   
In the era of Pax Sinica, however, China is most likely to live out its 
frustrations with two previous predators, namely: Western imperialism and 
Stalinist-type chauvinism. It will rise to the call for international justice,
 recalling the role that China played in inserting the term ǒjusticeō into 
the U.N. Charter, as discussed above. And, it will stand in opposition to 
the Western notion (and practice) of social Darwinism, which provided the 
justification for the ǒWhiteman’s burdenō in the past. And it will be equally 
opposed to the Soviet notion of ǒproletarian internationalism,ō which meant, 
in the heydays of Soviet power, that the Soviet Union had the right to ride 
herd on its followers in the Soviet bloc.  At the practical level, ǒjusticeō 
will encompass social justice, showing empathy for the ǒunderdogsō in the 
world.

This Chinese posture, wittingly or unwittingly, will be in keeping with 
the Confucian teaching of wangdao, staying away from leading by coercion 
or intimidation. Let’s recall that, in 1995, the Chinese Communist Party 
began to celebrate Confucius’ birthday. Since then, Confucius and Confucian 
teachings have come back with a vengeance. The Confucian Analects is taught 
from the first grade in primary school up. And, it is expounded on CCTV 
national television.

	At home, China, under socialism, will practice disciplined centralism. 
But internationally, it will practice anti-Chauvinism as well as anti-social 
Darwinism. One tell-tale clue is China’s policy toward North Korea. As 
Drew Thompson (2010) noted, despite its nearly total dependence on China 
for its sustenance and even survival, North Korea is treated by China as 
a ǒgood neighbor,ō but not as a client or satellite.  (Stalin’s Soviet 
Union would never treat North Korea this way). 
 
	Acting out of self-confidence, and in conformity with its preference for 
leading without ostentatiously trying to lead, China may eventually learn 
to let international law and institutions play a more prominent role. If 
disputes, and even conflicts, can be resolved by reference to international 
law, and by judicial settlement, then the Chinese superpower will not have 
to act as the ultimate arbitrator. This leadership style will stand in contrast 
to the habitual interventionist reflex of past hegemonic powers, their rhetoric 
to the contrary notwithstanding. If China is true to its anti-social Darwinism 
convictions, it will learn to stay clear of the power play of past hegemonic 
leaders.  

	Studies have shown that in recent years, China has demonstrated 
increasing interest in U.N. peace-keeping (or PKO) operations-- several of which 
involved a human rights component (e.g., El Salvador). It even participated in 
U.N. debates on the implementation of the R2P (the right to protect) of the 
world community (Welsh 2004; 2008).  From this increasing Chinese participation 
has emerged a prudent, balanced approach to international governance (Bates 
and Huang 2009). While China supported, in principle, humanitarian intervention 
for the protection of the security and rights of the native population in 
failed states (such as Somalia), it also called for strengthening the capacity 
of these governments, so that they would be better able to take care of 
the rights of their own people at home. A distinct Chinese style was its 
preference to rely more on private exhortation than on outright condemnation.
 On another front, the same Chinese prudent and balanced approach applies 
equally to concerns about the environment. To the Chinese, while environment-
control responsibilities are incumbent on all states, the sovereign right 
of a state to develop internally should likewise be recognized. 

	In the age of Pax Sinica, China will most likely stand for an 
equilibrium in two sets of ideals:  
It will show equal respect for state sovereignty and the primacy of certain 
community concerns (such as the environment and the global commons); and 
It will support harmony within diversity, while emphasizing the centrality 
of certain overriding community goals and interests (such as peace and security; 
poverty reduction; spread of education; fight on AIDS; ban on weapons of 
mass destruction, and fight on terrorism and on trafficking in drugs and 
in women for prostitution, etc.). 

Thus far, as is shown in its active role in the world community’s fight 
to control the African HIV/AIDS crisis, China has proven to be more than 
a by-stander for the liberal international order. Its empathy for the HIV/AIDS 
victims has catapulted China into active participation, in concert with other 
major powers, in the global health governance efforts (Chan 2010). Looking 
into the future, this cautious posture will likely underline China’s approach 
to international governance in all issue areas, from the initial stage of 
Pax Sinica onward. 

Moreover, for a guide to world peace under Pax Sinica, China is most likely 
to revive the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, first formulated 
by Premier Zhou Enlai with India’s Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, back 
in 1954 (Hsiung 1972: 32ff). In the governance of the world’s finance and 
trade, the G-20 will probably outshine the G-7 as a ǒBoard of Directorsō 
in global governance. But, G-20 will not displace the Bretton Woods system 
(the IMF, the World Bank, etc.) or the World Trade Orgaization (WTO). Typical 
of the Chinese deference to precedents set by one’s predecessor (known 
in Chinese as xiaogui caosui, 蕭規曹隨), China as the succeeding superpower 
is not expected to drastically supplant these post-WWII institutions born 
of what is known as the liberal theory of peace. The theory consists of 
two arguments: (1) Free trade substantially reduces the number of targets 
against which force might be applied in the pursuit of state interest (cf. 
Knorr 1973: 196; Keohane and Nye 1977: 28); and (2) Free trade increases 
the vulnerability of actors because of their increased interdependence, 
making them disinclined to entertain the risks of resorting to force (Keohane 
and Nye 1977: 28-29; Tucker 1977: 174-175; Gilpin 1975: 227).  Both the Bretton 
Woods System and the GATT/WTO regime epitomize the free-trade and 
non-protectionist spirit of this liberal theory of peace. In practical terms, if 
values and resources can be freely exchanged or obtained from the international 
free market, nations have no reason to go to war to obtain the same at much 
higher costs. In the three decades since the Dengist reform started in 1978, 
China has got itself so deeply entrenched into this post-WWII free-trade system 
that it has created what Richard Rosecrance (2006) calls a ǒvulnerability 
interdependenceō with the United States, EU members, Japan, and others. 
If it seeks to undermine the existing system, it will almost amount to a 
suicidal coup. It is, therefore, highly unlikely that China will destroy 
the system in which it already has so much at stake. 

Regional Implications under Pax Sinica 

   At the regional level, the shape of the regions as they exist today will 
most likely survive, but under the influence of geoeconomics states will 
find themselves more entangled in a labyrinthine network of free-trade 
associations (FTAs), including cross-regional ones. In the Pacific Asian region, 
China will probably feel most comfortable playing the role of the exalted 
suzerain in an updated version of the Chinese tribute system from traditional 
times. 
And, let’s not forget the findings from Prof. David Kang’s study of the 
traditional Chinese tribute system. As a system of international relations 
unto itself, it had fewer wars than its Westphalian counterpart, in the 
six centuries he studied. The Chinese avoidance of formal rigid arrangements 
will match the ASEAN’s informal approach to institutions. Thus, the Asian 
regional building will be a process typified more by emphasis on camaraderie 
than on rapid breakthroughs. 
True to the Chinese preference for leading by suasion and exemplification, 
three developments can be expected for the Asian region. 
	*First, China will probably draw an ever-increasing number of students 
from the neighboring countries. Already, for instance, in 2009 China was 
the destination for nearly 67-thousand South Korean students, almost as 
many as the South Korean students that went to the United States for advanced 
education. But, in the age of Pax Sinica, China will most likely draw many 
more foreign students from near and far.
	*Second, I expect China to be the linchpin, or anchor, but not 
necessarily the hegemonic leader, of the enlarged Pacific Asian regional 
grouping that is currently in the making.  Known by its misnomer of East Asian 
Summit (EAS), the grouping consists of the 10 members of ASEAN (or Association 
for Southeast Asian Nations), plus the ǒinner 3ō states (including China, 
South Korea, and Japan), and the ǒouter 3ō (Australia, New Zealand, and 
India). In its current scheme of things, reflecting the aspirations of the 
ASEAN, the United States is not included.  But, with China’s ascent, I 
have a feeling that, contrary to expectations, Beijing will be brokering 
the incorporation of the United States in the EAS grouping.  Why?  Well, 
for the same reason for which President Ma Ying-jeou in Taiwan co-opted 
talents from opposing political parties to serve in his Government. This 
is consistent with the Chinese notion of leading by inclusion, for the sake 
of converting potential opponents into partners and, no less important, 
of cultivating the image of a magnanimous leader -- that is, magnanimous, 
as opposed to hegemonic, leader. 

And, a good image is necessary for establishing China’s legitimacy and 
acceptability to the rest of the world.  With the addition of Russia, the 
EAS (or whatever name it will have) will by then be comprised of 18 members. 
Because of their dual membership in the Shanghai Cooperative Organization 
(SCO), China and Russia will most likely serve as a cement between SCO and 
the Pacific Asian regional grouping.  With the inclusion of China, Japan, 
the United States, and Russia, the EAS will be the largest trade bloc, 
outshining both the EU and the NAFTA.  As to the APEC (Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation forum), the current 21-member region-wide grouping, will face a 
future of uncertainty.
	* Last, but not least, the implications of Pax Sinica for Taiwan. Once 
China is in the position as the reigning predominant power, its fear of 
Taiwan going a separatist route will diminish. This is because Beijing knows 
that in the age of geoeconomics, a resource-deficient Taiwan cannot go it 
alone, but will be more attuned to the idea of integration with the mainland,
beginning with the economic domain. In its present status, Taiwan is not 
part of any regional free-trade networking arrangement, except for its 
membership in the APEC. But, with the uncertain fate befalling APEC itself, as 
noted above, Taiwan will find its isolation threatening to its survival. Hence, 
both its fear of exclusion and the steep hierarchy in the region’s power 
structure will make Taiwan, like other regional actors, turn bandwagoning 
to mainland China. Taiwan will find playing this game a sine qua non for 
its survival. In the age of deepening geoeconomics, Taiwan will find, economic 
security will outweigh the traditional concerns of political autonomy and 
military security (i.e., national defense).

	Already, even during the present run-up to China’s Second Rise, we are 
witnessing signs of the region’s states playing bandwagoning to China--and, 
all this is happening despite U.S. attempts to contain China by building 
new coalitions within the region. Two examples will suffice to document this 
trend. First, despite Washington’s attempt to corral Vietnam as an ally 
to isolate China, the Vietnamese Deputy Defense Minister (Nguyen Chi Wing) 
declared during his visit in Beijing, on August 25, 2010, that his country, 
Vietnam, would never ( I repeat ǒneverō) be in an alliance with the United 
States. Instead, he said ǒVietnam would à want China to play a greater à 
non-traditional security roleō in Southeast Asia, where China has more experience.
  By "non-traditional security role," he was referring to China’s lead 
in the Sino-ASEAN cooperation in the suppression of piracy, smuggling, human 
trafficking, drug trade, transnational criminal organizations, illegal 
immigration, cyber-piracy and cyber attacks, terrorism, subversion, etc. (Arase 
2010: 809). 
The timing of the Vietnamese official’s statement is particularly noteworthy.
It came one month after Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made an offer 
of U.S. help to mediate ASEAN’s South China Sea disputes with China, and 
just two weeks after the United States announced a joint maritime exercise 
with Vietnam to be held in the South China Sea. The other example concerns 
Australia. During Secretary Clinton’s visit in Australia, in March 2009, 
her Australian counterpart told her, point-blank, that Australia would not 
be interested in joining the United States in a coalition against China. 
After the U.S.-South Korean joint maritime exercise in July 25-28 on the 
Japan Sea off the coast of North Korea, and amidst talks of more such exercises 
in the Yellow Sea near China’s Beijing-Tianjin nerve center, the Australian 
navy joined the Chinese navy in a maritime exercise in the Yellow Sea, on 
September 23. The exercise tested joint search-and-rescue missions. Using 
live ammunitions and flying targets, it tested artillery targeting and 
intercepting capability of the participating ships. I expect this trend of the 
region’s states bandwagoning to China to continue as its power edge in the 
broad Pacific Asia region further expands. In steep hierarchy, to reiterate, 
lesser states will bandwagon, rather than balancing the predominant state.
Furthermore, Taiwan will know that, given a different power ratio between 
China and the United States in the age of Pax Sinica, the U.S. factor as 
a road-block to cross-Strait relations will recede to the background. If 
Taiwan is wise, it will learn not to alienate mainland China, and that, instead,
 gravitating toward it will be in Taiwan’s interest. It’s important to 
note that in a recent poll, 63% of the people polled in Taiwan said they 
did NOT think that a rising, powerful China will necessarily be a threat 
to Taiwan’s security. (Parenthetically, if the opposition DPP continues 
its opposition to closer ties with the mainland, it will lose its support 
among Taiwan’s voters.)
	Earlier this year (June 29, 2010), Taiwan and the mainland signed an 
agreement known by its acronym ECFA, which stands for Economic Cooperation 
Framework Agreement. In the few months after its signing, Taiwan was able to 
draw as much as US$400-billion in foreign investments from various foreign 
sources. With the ECFA in place, foreign investors in Taiwan have an added 
advantage of ready access to mainland Chinese markets. To Taiwan, ECFA is a 
life-saver during the present global economic crisis. I expect more such 
ECFA-like initiatives to come from mainland China as inducements to Taiwan for 
closer integration, beginning for example with a customs union and maybe a 
common market to follow. In public-opinion polls, 70% of the people in Taiwan 
supported ECFA; and 73% said they would like to move to the mainland in search 
of jobs. 
According to a September 19 report of BERI, a business risk rating firm, 
post-ECFA Taiwan now ranks No. 4 on the list of the best trade and investment 
places in Asia. As such, Taiwan beats Japan, mainland China, and South Korea,
which ranked Nos. 6, 15, and 18, respectively.  All this augurs well for 
future cross-Strait relations. 
	Another thing most likely to happen is that an ever-increasing number of
Taiwan students will receive an open arm from schools and institutions of 
higher learning in mainland China. It is logical to expect the coming 
generations of mainland-educated Taiwan students to be the future catalysts for 
closer integration between the two sides across the Taiwan Strait.
	In the same spirit of inclusivism, and as cross-Strait mutual trust 
improves, Beijing can reasonably be expected to take another initiative, which 
will make its relations with Taiwan more palatable and oriented toward the 
direction of ǒsocial harmony,ō as pronounced by Hu Jintao some time ago. But, it 
will happen quietly, and without pressure mounted by anyone, either from Taiwan 
or any other source. I am referring to the quiet removal, on Beijing’s 
own accord, of the 1,000 mainland missiles cumulatively re-targeted at Taiwan 
since the days of estrangement during the eight-year presidency of Chen 
Shui-bian. The reason is that cross-Strait relations will be no longer bedeviled 
by the high tension and mutual distrust spawned by Chen Shui-bian’s separatist 
policies in Taiwan. And, to reiterate, mainland China will be less worried 
about Taiwan seeking a separatist existence—especially if political changes 
within mainland China should make its system more compatible with Taiwan’
s political institutions.  
	I don’t want to suggest that the cross-Strait relations will be all roses. 
All I am saying is that in the days of Pax Sinica, mainland China will approach 
Taiwan with greater confidence. China will realize that its image will be 
very different if it acts with civility and compassion. And, Taiwan, if it 
acts rationally, will find it to its own advantage to respond positively 
in kind. Nevertheless, in my reckoning, reunification is not likely unless 
two conditions are ripe: First, the per capita income of the 1.3 billion 
people on the mainland matches, or even surpasses, that of Taiwan’s 23 
million.  Second, internal changes on the mainland have led to the emergence 
of a system  palatable to the constituency in Taiwan.  Both these conditions 
will help eradicate the awesome fright with which the majority of Taiwan’
s population is seized for the ǒcolossusō across the Taiwan Strait.     

A Happy Note and a Caveat
	I want to end this talk on a happy note and with a big caveat.  The 
happy note is that according to a most recent poll, released by the Chicago 
World Affairs Council on September 16, 2010, only 43% of the American 
respondents felt that the rising China would be a threat to the United States, 
if it should end up being a world-class major power. This is 10 points below the 
finding of ten years ago. In addition, 68% believed that the United States 
should cultivate a friendly and cooperative relationship with China, although 
58% thought that Washington ought to align with Japan and South Korea to 
contain China. 
	The caveat is that all I have said above, regarding what a Pax Sinica 
may look like, will be nullified in the event some third country should 
deliberately take calculated sabotaging actions to provoke a disaster or incite 
China to over-react – very much like what Japan did in its recent provocative 
action in the waters surrounding Dioyutai, an island the title to which is 
in dispute between China and Japan. On September 9, three heavily armed 
Japanese Coast-Guard ships surrounded a tiny Chinese fishing vessel peacefully 
plying its trade, while sailing in what its crew believed to be within the 
territorial waters (or the exclusive economic zone) of a Chinese island. 
After twice colliding with the Chinese fishing vessel, the Japanese arrested 
its skipper, holding him hostage for as long as he did not admit to his 
ǒcrime.ō In the meantime, Japanese media announced that Japan would conduct 
a joint military exercise with the United States naval forces. Dubbed ǒOperation 
Retaking Diaoyutai,ō the announced joint exercise was reportedly targeted 
at China as the imagined ǒenemyō that had forcibly captured the island.
Provocative actions like these may sound like a scenario for an exciting 
movie. But they are destined to force China to react, even over-react, against 
its best wishes.  More important, they will render all my predictions, regarding 
a peaceful Pax Sinica, totally irrelevant. 

Concluding Remarks

	I have two concluding remarks to make. First, if there is any way to sum 
up what I have said about the multiple implications of China’s second ascent,
 it should be that a re-rising China should be considered more as a new 
ǒoptionō than an alternative to what is pre-existing.  Hence, unlike what 
Martin Jacques says in his book, China’s re-rise will not spell the ǒend 
of the West," but will decidedly usher in a ǒnew world order."
 
	Second, as I said, even though nobody has a definitive answer on how 
China will fare and behave in its second ascent, I promised I would try to offer 
a way by which a reasonably adequate answer can be deduced from existing 
evidence. Such is the job of a professor, and I hope I have proven my 
professorial credentials.    Thank you. 


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---------------------------

Text of a talk in Hong Kong, hosted by the China Energy Fund Committee, 
October 20, 2020. 


Copyright(c) 2005, National Association for China's Peaceful Unification(NACPU), Washington D.C., USA. All rights reserved.