Tze-chung Li 李志鍾
Professor and Dean Emeritus, Dominican University &
President, One China Committee 一中會
Taiwan is an integral part of China. Taiwan and China separated
as a result of civil war in 1949, and since then have been governed separately.
They are two political entities in China, but not two Chinas.
Unification of Taiwan is a domestic issue and should be decided by Taiwan
and China themselves. Since the United States is involved, unification becomes
complicated and extremely difficult to achieve. Four positions taken in
the United States on the unification issue may be mentioned.
1. The official position. The United States official position is constructively
ambiguity. It is constructive that the United States abides by the three
Communiqu and supports one China and Taiwan a part of China. It is ambiguous
in that the United States continues sale of military equipment to Taiwan
to make Taiwan capable of defending against China’s attack, insists to maintain
the ill-defined status quo to exercise restraints on both Taiwan and China
to avoid war, and makes it uncertain for military involvement in defending
Taiwan. Though clarity of ambiguity had been made in favor of China or
Taiwan in the past from President Clinton’s three nos 21 to President Bush’
s explicit statement of defending Taiwan, 22 the U.S. strategy remains
ambiguous. The ambiguous strategy is considered safer, smarter, as well
as more realistic. It allows the United States if, when, and how might protect
Taiwan.23
The United States opposes any move contrary to the status quo. Deputy
Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick has summarized the U.S. position on
Taiwan in six points. The United States should (1) maintain "one China
policy"; (2) abide by three Communiqu and Taiwan Relations Act; (3) assist
Taiwan's accession to APEC and WTO as an economy; (4) make defensive articles
available to Taiwan; (5) insist no unilateral change in the status quo by
either side of the Taiwan Strait; and (6) support direct dialogue, including
with elected leaders of Taiwan. 24 In responding to Rep. Diane Watson’
s complaints about how Taiwan's president was treated during his visit to
Latin America, he said "we want to be supportive of Taiwan, while we're
not encouraging those that try to move toward independence. Because let
me be very clear: independence means war." 25
The United States clearly rejects independence for Taiwan and even change
of the name of Taiwan.26 Deputy Secretary Richard L. Armitage considers
that the Taiwan Relations Act requires the United States to keep sufficient
force in the Pacific to be able to deter attack, but the United States has
no obligation to defend Taiwan. 27 On the Taiwan government's attempt
to change their official name of ROC to Taiwan, Adam Ereli, State Department
Deputy Spokesman said: "there are reports of a number of sort of impending
name changes. . . frankly, we're not supportive of them. As you know, the
United States has an interest in maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait.
That's what we want to see, and we are therefore opposed to any unilateral
steps that would change the status quo."28
After the Hu-Bush meeting April 20, 2006, President Bush remarked at the
Oval Office regarding Taiwan: "We spent time talking about Taiwan, and I
assured the President my position has not changed. I do not support independence
for Taiwan."
2. The position to defend Taiwan. Others hold the view that the United
States must defend Taiwan because American interest is at stake. As pointed
out in the Annual Report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission to Congress, China's economic integration with its neighbors
in East Asia raises the prospects of an Asian economic area dominated or
significantly influenced by China. The U.S. has an interest in China's integration
in Asia if it gives all parties a stake in avoiding hostilities. Nonetheless,
U.S. influence in the area could wane to a degree. 29 To defend Taiwan,
the Commission recommends that the Department of Defense continues its substantive
military dialogue with Taiwan and conducts exchanges on issues ranging from
threat analysis, doctrine, and force planning. 30
In contrast to Armitage’s position noted above, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Randall G. Schriver who claims himself
as pro-Taiwan, but not anti-China says: "[t]he Taiwan Relations Act not
only talks about providing weapons for sufficient self-defense. . . we have
an obligation to maintain the capacity to resist force if asked to do so.
. . That's not a defense treaty, but there are some very important obligations
there."31
According to U.S.-Taiwan defense doctrine, the Taiwanese military would
have to fight an invasion alone for at least four days until American naval
forces arrive. But China could also go with a so-called decapitation strategy
-- coordinated commando attacks and pinpoint bombing of the island's leaders
and key institutions to paralyze the island before American reinforcements
can arrive. 32
The United States is concerned with the loss of influence in the Far East,
if Taiwan is unified with China. An Independent Task Force on U.S.-China
relations, established by the Council on Foreign Relations, reports that
one drive for Chinese military modernization is to have the ability to fight
and win a war in Taiwan in the absence of U.S. intervention and recommends
that the U.S. make its stance on Taiwan more explicit, that is United States
does not rule out using force to deter Chinese attempt to compel unification
through force. 33
A RAND report points out that the most likely conflict between the United
States and China would be over Taiwan. 34 China could potentially defeat
the United States in a future military conflict over Taiwan by using “antiaccess”
strategies designed to limit U.S. military access to the combat zone.
The net result of these strategies is that China could actually defeat the
United States in a conflict -- not in the traditional sense of destroying
the U.S. military, but in the sense of China accomplishing its military
and political objectives while preventing America from achieving some or
all of its objectives. Another RAND report outlines three key security
challenges to the United States, its interests, and its allies: terrorist
and insurgent groups; regional powers with nuclear weapons; and increasing
security competition in Asia, which could result in a military confrontation
with China over Taiwan. RAND suggests measures to overcome modern anti-access
weapons and methods, particularly theater ballistic missiles and cruise
missiles.35
Jed Babbin and Edward Timperlake consider China’s military growth poses
a threat to American security. 36 There is possible certainty of war with
China. With respect to Taiwan, they state: "President Bush and his successors
must take a ‘tough force’ approach with the Taiwanese. If the Taiwanese
are unwilling to spend the necessary money to defend themselves they should
be told in unmistakable terms that we will not spend blood and treasure
in their defense. The Taiwanese need a big dose of reality.”37
The Hudson Institute reports China's rising high technology and military
power pose a challenge to the United States. In China-Taiwan conflict,
China may (1) seize the initiative early by forcing an adversary to react
to China's move; (2) pursue limited strategic aims, by winning and securing
Taiwan with a fait accompli to avoid harming any of the United States main
interest; (3) strike five "key points", namely command systems, information
system, weapon systems, logistics systems, and the linkage among these;
and (4) avoid direct confrontation, by defeating a handful of critical defenses;
and (5) utilize high technology war and prepare against the military intervention.
It is a seven-day war (blitzkrieg operation) to occupy Taiwan. The U.S.
must be prepared to fight the twenty-first century version of war. 38
At his confirmation hearing before the Senate armed services committee
March 8. U.S. Navy Adm. Timothy Keating warned that as China increases its
military spending, the United States needs to keep a watchful eye over Taiwan.
The admiral emphasized that the United States should be prepared to step
in to protect Taiwan should the need occur, even though some members of Congress
have warned that Taiwan has sometimes gone out of its way to provoke a hostile
confrontation with China in an attempt to declare independence from the
Communist state. 39 Adm. Keating also said April 15 in Guam that tensions
over Taiwan are a factor in the military buildup of Guam but the U.S. was
working with China and Taiwan to avert any conflict over the island.40
In a report to Congress on China’s military power, the Department of
Defense points out China is now building capacity for conventional precision
strike. Beijing has strengthened position relative to Taipei by increasing
the mainland's economic leverage over Taiwan, fostering Taiwan's diplomatic
isolation, and shifting the cross-Strait military balance in the mainland's
favor. But the U.S. Department of Defense, through the transformation of
U.S. Armed Forces and global force posture realignments, is maintaining
the capacity to resist any effort by Beijing to resort to force to dictate
the terms of Taiwan's future status. 41
The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Institute for
International Economics consider that military conflict between China and
Taiwan is not inevitable. When it to occur, however, it would very likely
lead to serious political, and potentially military, conflict between the
United States and China. U.S. policy toward the Taiwan impasse has been
primarily concerned with process; the United States urges that any resolution
be peaceful and non-coercive (thus pursuing a declared policy of "peaceful
resolution" rather than Beijing's "peaceful reunification"). Washington also
has declared its opposition to unilateral actions by either side to change
the status quo. But, the ball of unifying China is in China's hand to display
more creativity in its approach to Taiwan to truly win the hearts and minds
of the island's people in order to ensure the peaceful achievement of unification.
42
3. The hands-off position. James McGregor considers that U.S. and China
have manageable differences and complimentary interests. The United States
could help China and itself at the same time. He suggests that domestic
politics should stop at the U.S. border and stop preaching instant democracy.
43
The issue of Taiwan could lead to a disastrous war between the United States
and China, says Ted Galen Carpenter. The United States, China, and Taiwan
are on a collision course, and unless something dramatically changes, an
armed conflict is virtually inevitable within a decade. Carpenter explains
what the United States must do quickly to avoid being dragged into war. The
United States should make it clear and firm that the United States will
not become involved in any armed struggle between Taiwan and China if a
conflict between Taiwan and China occurs.44
Richard C. Bush points out three aggravating factors on the relations:
(1) the impact of domestic politics in each country, as in Taiwan, there
is a strong Taiwanese identity and significant fear of outsiders; (2) decision-
making on each side on the cross-Strait issue is centralized and personalized;
and (3) the zero-sum leverage game, that is there is little that Taiwan
can do to influence Chinese politics. Bush cautions the danger that both
sides consider that time favors its adversary. For some forces in Taiwan
to conclude that the only way to secure the future is to go for independence
while China is relatively weak and constrained by the Olympics, whereas
to China, preemptive military action is needed to keep the door to unification
from closing. The danger is to invite unnecessary conflict. Both sides should
take option of shaping the current situation to maximize their shared interests
and minimize the risk of a foolish conflict. 45
4. The pro-independence position. Lawrence B. Wilkerson, the U.S. Army
Colonel who was Collin Powell’s chief of staff through two administrations,
points out that ”neocons” in the top of the administration quietly encouraged
Taiwanese politicians to move toward a declaration of independence from
mainland China. They included such key architects of the Iraq War as Paul
Wolfowitz, the deputy defense secretary, Douglas Feith, the undersecretary
for policy, and Steven Cambone, Rumsfeld’s intelligence chief, and President
Bush’s controversial envoy to the United Nations, John Bolton. The Defense
Department was dispatching a person to Taiwan every week, essentially to
tell the Taiwanese that the alliance was back on. 46
Reports James Fallows, former senator Gary Hart, who served as co-chair
of the "U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century," the Hart-Rudman
Commission, mentioned Mrs. Lynne Cheney on the commission opined that the
overwhelming threat was from China. Sooner or later the U.S. would end up
in a military showdown with the Chinese Communists. There was no avoiding
it, and we would only make ourselves weaker by waiting. No one else spoke
up in support. The same argument happened at the second meeting. Finally,
in frustration, she left the commission. Hart added. "I am convinced that
if it had not been for 9/11, we would be in a military showdown with China
today." Not because of what China was doing, threatening, or intending,
he made clear, but because of the assumptions the Administration brought
with it when taking office .47
Another key character in the hawkish group was Therese Shaheen, wife of
Rumsfield's spokesman, DiRita, the former chief of the U.S. office of the
American Institute in Taiwan. She openly championed the independence movement,
at one point even publicly reinterpreting President Bush's reiteration
of the "one China" policy, saying that the administration "had never said
it opposed Taiwan independence." Colin Powell asked for her resignation.
48
On February 16, 2007, Representative Thomas G. Tancredo introduced Bipartisan
Resolution that would call for the United States to resume normal diplomatic
relations with Taiwan.49 U.S. lawmakers introduced a resolution June 26,
2007 for an end to restrictions on visits to the United States by high-level
Taiwanese officials. The resolution was unanimously adopted by a voice vote
on July 30, 2007. A parallel resolution is in the works in the Senate.
The resolution's sponsor in the House, Republican Steve Chabot, says it
is time to send a clear message to Beijing over Taiwan, which the United
States is legally bound to defend in any military conflict.50 Rep. Steve
Chabot is a strong supporter of Taiwan. In his letter to Examiner a year
ago, Rep. Chabot considers that "there is a lot more at stake for the U.S.
than who controls power in Taipei. Should Taiwan decide to move in the direction
of accommodation with the PRC, U.S. interests in Asia would steadily be
eroded.51
Bruce Herschensohn, another staunch supporter of Taiwan, states that the
first Shanghai Communiqué was intentionally misinterpreted as a basis for
the other two Communiqu.52 He produced President Nixon’s letter to
President Carter in which President Nixon expressed concern about President
Carter’s recognition of China with no adequate guarantees against the use
of force to resolve the Taiwan issue. 53 The letter appears to be contrary
to the declassified President Nixon’s assurance noted earlier. Herschensohn
urges the United States to defend Taiwan as a democratic nation.
The U. S. official position insists on the status quo and peaceful resolution
on unification and remains ambiguous in defending Taiwan. The U.S. Congress
is incredibly supportive of Taiwan. Congressional support takes a number
of bipartisan initiatives to focus more U.S. attention on Taiwan and to raise
its international status which include House establishment of the Congressional
Taiwan Caucus in 2002, Senate establishment of the Senate Taiwan Caucus
in 2003, 54 and fairly recently House resolution to lift restrictions on
Taiwan high officials visit to the United States, noted earlier. While opposing
Taiwan’s move for independence, Senator Dianne Feinstein gave scary remarks:
there is a “mind-set in Congress” and “China is destined to become an
enemy of the U.S.” 55
American public, however, tends to support one China and Taiwan a part
of China. In 2003, the Foreign Policy Association released its National
Opinion Ballot Report which highlights its findings on Taiwan: (1) 26 percent
yes and 74 percent no to the question, should the U.S. make an explicit pledge
to defend Taiwan against an invasion from the mainland; (2) 35 percent yes
and 65 percent no to the question, should the U.S. encourage Taiwan's quest
for independence.56 But, public opinion is volatile.
To unify Taiwan with China may be achieved by force at a risk of possible
conflict with the United States. The result will be devastating in a heavy
loss of human lives and properties. To pursue peaceful unification, though
not an up-hill fight, has roadblocks in the way.
Chinese in the United States who believe in a strong, unified, prosperous
China is to their interest and pride, are supporting with passion and tenacity
unification of Taiwan. They have formed organizations to advocate, advance,
and promote unification, such as Hetonghui (Peaceful Unification of China
Association), Cutonghui (Advocating Unification Association), One China
Committee, New York Association for Peaceful Unification of China, Taiwan
Alliance for One China Action, and others. Both Hetonghui and Cutonghui
have a number of chapters in the States, with slightly different names.
Hetonghui will hold its Global Summit for China’s Peaceful Unification
in Washington, D.C., on November 16-18, 2007. The New York Association
and the Taiwan Alliance are organized by Chinese Americans born in Taiwan.
The One China Committee was formed by a group of Americans and Americans
of Chinese descent.57
Their mission and efforts are in unison. It is their challenge to campaign
vigorously to the American public and private sectors on one China and Taiwan
is a part of China. Efforts are to be devoted to (1) inform and update
members of Congress on unification of Taiwan; (2) try to change the mind-set
of Congress in favor of unification; (3) provide the media, scholars and
the general public with information on the cause of unification; (4) start
a grassroots campaign for one China; (5) suggest the United States to diminish
or abandon involvement in Taiwan; and (6) reiterate no legal obligation on
the United States to defend Taiwan.
NOTES
21. Three nos policy by Clinton: (1) no support for an independent Taiwan;
(2) no recognition of "two Chinas" or one China and a separate Taiwan; and
(3) no support for Taiwan's admission to any international organization
that requires statehood as a condition for membership
22. President Bush stated on the ABC Good Morning America April 25, 2001
that the United States would do whatever it takes to help Taiwan to defend
itself. In April 2001, the President also approved a substantial sale of
U.S. weapons to Taiwan, including Kidd-class destroyers, anti-submarine P-3
"Orion" aircraft, and diesel submarines. The White House also was more accommodating
to visits from Taiwan officials than previous U.S. Administrations.
23. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “Strategic Ambiguity or Strategic Clarity?”
in Tucker, ed. Dangerous Strait: The U.S. – Taiwan – China Crisis (Columbia
University Press, 2005), pp. 205-210.
24. In his presentation on U.S.-China relations before the Committee on
International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives on May 10, 2006.
25. Ibid.
26. Sean McCormack, U.S. Department of State Spokesman at daily briefing
on March 4, 2007, stated “as is well established, the United States does
not support independence for Taiwan. President Bush has repeatedly underscored
his opposition to unilateral changes to the status quo by either Taipei or
Beijing because these threaten regional peace and stability, U.S. national
interest and Taiwan's own welfare.”
27. U.S. Department of State released December 20, 2004 the transcript of
an interview of Charlie Rose with Deputy Secretary Richard L. Armitage on
PBS on December 10. Mr. Armitage also repeated the U.S. official position
that “[w]e all agree that there is but one China, and Taiwan is part of
China. We are guided in our own relationship with China by three communiqu
, which have been negotiated by successive Administrations, and the Taiwan
Relations Act. And successive Administrations since the time of normalization
in 1979 have been able to carry forth, develop relations with China and maintain
good relations with the people of Taiwan."
28. At the daily press briefing of the State Department on December 6, 2006
in Washington, D.C.
29. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) released its
2006 annual report on November 16, 2006. The Commission is a bipartisan
organization established by Congress in 2000 to investigate, analyze and
provide recommendations to Congress on the economic and national security
implications of the U.S.-China relationship
30, Ibid.
31. Testimony in Congress on February 7, 2004.
32. Peter Enav, San Francisco Chronicle, August 12, 2006.
33. Council on Foreign Relations, U.S.-China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda,
a Responsible Course (2007), pp. 47-54, 86-87.
34. Released on March 29, 2007.
35. A New Division of Labor: Meeting America's Security Challenges Beyond
Iraq, prepared by RAND Project AIR FORCE, the U.S. Air Force's federally
funded research and development center for studies and analyses.
36. Showdown: Why China Wants War With the United States (Regnery, 2006).
an essay and a fiction, presenting hawkish and provocative view on China's
fast growing military strength.
37. Ibid., p. 150.
38. China’s New Great Leap Forward: High Technology and Military Power
in the Next Half-Century (2005).
39. Shihoko Goto, United Press International, Mach 10, 2007
40. Audrey Mcavoy, Terrorism Research Center, Apr 16, 2007
41. U.S. Department of Defense released May 25 a report to Congress on China’
s military power pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act Fiscal
Year 2000. Precision capacity includes Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs)
, Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) (1000-3000 km). Land-Attack Cruise
Missiles (LACMs), Air-to-Surface Missiles (ASMs). And Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles
(ASCMs).
42. Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Institute for
International Economics, China: The Balance Sheet (Public Affairs, 2006).
43. James McGregor, “Advantage, China. In This Match, They Play Us Better
Than We Play Them," Washington Post, July 31, 2005.
44. Ted Galen Carpenter, America’s Coming War with China: A Collision
Course over Taiwan (Palgrave Macmillan , 2006). Dr. Carpenter is Vice President
for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute.
45. Richard C. Bush, Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait.
(Brookings Institution Press, 2005). Mr. Bush is former chairman and managing
director of the American Institute in Taiwan, based in Washington, D.C.
46. Reported by Jeff Stein, CQ, June 1, 2007.
47. Hart’s conversation with James Fallows in an article, The AtlanticOnline,
July 5, 2007. The Philippine LaRouche Society gave the article an alarming
title: "The Cheney Gang Planned War on China."
48. Note 45,
49. H. Cong Res 73.
50. Yahoo!News, June 26, 2007. The resolution was passed unanimously by
a voice vote on July 30, 2007. A similar resolution which was introduced
by Rep. Chabot in 2004 and again in 2006 went nowhere. Washington Post,
August 1, 2007.
51. Letter to Examiner, June 30, 2006.
52. Bruce Herschensohn, Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy (World Aheard,
2006), p. 26.
53. Ibid., pp. 32-33.
54. In an update report in March 2006, "Taiwan: Recent Developments and
U.S. Policy Choices," by Kerry B. Dumbaugh.
55. In a question-and-answer session, Feinstein said after her speech at
the annual meeting of the Committee 100 in San Francisco on April 21, 2006.
Reported David Armstrong, San Francisco Chronicle, April 21, 2006
56. Foreign Policy Association 2003 annual Great Decisions which includes
the National Opinion Ballot Report. The national opinion ballot survey has
conducted since 1955.
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